Joint Seminar with the GERAD and the Chair in Game Theory and Management

Title: Technological choice in an evolutionary oligopoly game

Speaker: Fabio Lamentia – Universitá della Calabria, Italy

Abstract: We propose and analyze a two-stage oligopoly game in which firms first simultaneously choose production technologies and in the second stage simultaneously choose production quantities. After characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the game, we cast our static model in a dynamic setting exploring the stability properties of the market equilibrium in two different cases: (i) exogenous technology distribution and Cournot adjustments; (ii) endogenous technology distribution in an infinite population game with Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs. The main aim of the paper is that of extending the results about Cournot oligopoly stability in an evolutionary setting of heterogeneous decreasing returns-to-scale technologies. We show how the interplay between production decisions and R&D decisions can generate endogenous market fluctuations leading to complex dynamic phenomena.

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