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Séminaire Fondation HEC Montréal | Chaire de théorie des jeux et gestion | GERAD

Séminaire Fondation HEC Montréal | Chaire de théorie des jeux et gestion | GERAD

Titre : Strategic Location Choice under Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition and Spillovers

Conférencier : DAWID, Herbert (Bielefeld University, Allemagne)

Résumé
This paper investigates firms' optimal location choice explicitly accounting for the role of inward and outward spillovers. A dynamic Cournot oligopoly with firms that are heterogeneous in their ability for carrying out cost-reducing R&D is considered. Firms can either locate in an industrial cluster or in isolation. Technological spillovers are exchanged between the firms in the cluster. It is shown that the technological leader has an incentive to locate in isolation only if her advantage exceeds a certain threshold. This threshold is increasing both in industry dispersion and in firms' discount rate. Scenarios are identified where although it is optimal for the technological leader to locate in the cluster, from a welfare perspective it would be desirable that she locates in the cluster.

Date

Monday September 30, 2013
Starts at 11:00

Price

gratuit

Contact

Place

Polytechnique Montréal - Pavillon principal
2500, chemin de Polytechnique
Montréal
QC
Canada
H3T 1J4
Salle 4488, Pavillon André-Aisenstadt, UdeM

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