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Séminaire : Differential game approach for international environmental agreements with social externalities

Séminaire :  Differential game approach for international environmental agreements with social externalities

Séminaire Fondation HEC conjoint avec la Chaire de théorie des jeux et gestion et le GERAD

Titre : Differential game approach for international environmental agreements with social externalities

Conférencier : Armando Sacco – Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza', Italie

Résumé :

In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social externalities affects the pay-offs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the players in two homogeneous groups, developed countries and developing countries. After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.


Entrée gratuite.
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Date

Mardi 9 février 2016
Débute à 11h00

Prix

gratuit

Contact

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Université de Montréal - Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal
QC
Canada
H3T 1N8
514 343-6111
4488

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