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Séminaire : A common information approach to stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information

Séminaire :  A common information approach to stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information

Séminaire informel de théorie des systèmes (ISS)

A common information approach to stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information
Demosthenis Teneketzis – University of Michigan, États-Unis

Stochastic Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information (SDGAI) arise in many areas, such as Engineering, Economics, Political Science, etc. The computation of equilibria in SDGAI is a formidable task. In this talk I will first discuss the difficulties associated with the computation of equilibria in SDGAI. Then,I will present ideas on how to alleviate some of these difficulties. I will also present an analogue of Maskin-Tirole’s methodology (Markov Perfect Equililibria) for SDGAI. Finally, I will briefly discuss some open problems in SDGAI.

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Entrée gratuite.

Bienvenue à tous!

 

Date

Jeudi 16 novembre 2017
Débute à 14h00

Prix

gratuit

Contact

Lieu

Université de Montréal - Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal
QC
Canada
H3T 1N8
514 343-6111
4488

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